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ABSTRACT 
Through empirical analysis of individual micro data from one peer-to-peer lending platform, this paper aims to expand the 
research on regional discrimination in China's P2P lending market from a new perspective. Descriptive statistics of orders and 
difference test of success rate show that, for cities of different grades, there is a huge difference in the success rate. The main 
empirical finding is that under the control of other factors, city grade has a significant positive effect on loan success rate, 
namely the success rate of cities developing better is higher, revealing the existence of regional discrimination. Further study 
find the default rate of less developed cities, whose success rate is lower, is relatively higher, which proves the regional 
discrimination here is a rational statistical discrimination. 
 
Keywords: P2P lending, regional discrimination, success rate, default rate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination is a kind of emotional reaction along with behavior appearing among different interest groups. In social 
sciences, it has both broad and narrow sense. In the broad sense it refers to "differential treatment", including "positive" as well 
as "negative" discrimination. For example, the policy of care for the vulnerable in sociology is a "positive" discrimination, and 
job rejection that women suffer is a "negative" discrimination [24]. On the other hand, in a narrow sense it refers to unfair 
treatment with negative meaning, where the same objects are treated unequally or diverse ones are treated equally [21]. 
Discrimination in the field of economics is mostly generalized, for economic agents usually have significant differences and 
think only about themselves. 
 
In the traditional financial market, in order to avoid risk and gain income, investors would consider various factors before 
making a decision. Due to the factors of family resources, knowledge, investment opportunity and personal investment 
orientation vary widely, and people’s risk bearing capacity being different, coupled with information asymmetry [26], so the 
investment is fraught with discrimination. And it is largely generalized "negative" discrimination. Pope and Sydnor point out 
that investors making decisions according to their own subjective feelings and preferences is tasted-based discrimination, and 
the choice of borrowers on the basis of some statistical results is statistical discrimination [15]. Classic finance presumed that, 
rational investors will make more multinational investment to spread risk. But in fact, investors punt most of their money on 
domestic market [8], which is known as “local bias”. Ravina’s research finds that, in the case of other factors being basically 
the same, borrowers with good employment records are more likely to win the favor of investors. In addition, credit record and 
income are usually the most important factors that investors consider [18]. Ghent et al. find that for 30 year adjustable rate 
mortgages African Americans borrowers face interest rates 12 basis points higher than non-Hispanic borrowers [9]. As 
Cozarenco and Szafarz say, it is still a challenge for women entrepreneurs to obtain credit [5]. There are grounds to suspect that 
unfair lending practices make it harder for women than for men to set up a business [23]. 
 
Peer-to-peer lending is a newfashioned credit mode where investors lends money to individuals or small and micro enterprises 
by network platform, which directly matching borrowers and investors [2] [11]. Peer-to-peer lending companies provide 
services through Internet with low operating costs, and their services are cheaper than traditional financial institutions. 
Borrowers need to provide qualification information to them, and after verification they set the loan amount, interest rates and 
deadlines by themselves as required. Only after communication with the platform can they publish the loan demand. Investors 
consider varieties of information disclosed by borrowers, including credit information, financial information and unverified 
statements of the loan purpose, before deciding whether to bid as well as the amount. This unsecured financing mode makes it 
possible for individuals to enter into microfinance. Compared with traditional bank credit, peer-to-peer lending, based on 
Internet and Web 2.0 technologies, can directly match borrowers with potential investors, reduce information asymmetry risk 
and facilitate transactions, so it is friendlier to both lenders and borrowers [2] [15]. 
 
However, discrimination still exists in peer-to-peer lending. Duarte, Siegel, and Young find that investors are more likely to 
lend to borrowers who look trustworthy, because they believe such people may have better credit and lower default rates [6]. 
There is a "herding effect" in Internet loan, that is, most investors tend to bid those that many have bidden [4]. Krumme and 
Herrero-Lopes point out borrowers with higher credit scores are apt to succeed; meanwhile, investors are expected to earn 
more [13]. Some scholars believe that the impact of population characteristics on loan is limited [22]. While some other 
scholars hold the opposite views. Studies have found that it is more difficult for blacks to get financing compared with whites 
[15] [19], perhaps because blacks have a higher default rate, indicating that this is a statistical discrimination. Recent work 
points to these characteristics may have unique intersectional effects [16] [20]. Lei, Qin, and Yulin construct a theoretical 
model to analyze the investment bias in P2P lending towards the use of loan [25]. The results say people prefer loan for 
production and operation. Li, Mengran, and Zhengwei study the regional discrimination in Chinese credit market [14]. 
Through an empirical study of a P2P platform, it is found that there is a significant difference in the success rates among each 
province, which explains the existence of regional discrimination in P2P lending. Subsequently, further investigation finds the 
default rates of being discriminated provinces are not significantly higher. Finally they conclude that it is a tasted-based 
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discrimination. Through an experiment, Harkness examine how applicants’ variety demographic characteristics affect investors’ 
status assessments and funding decisions in peer-to-peer lending market [10]. The results demonstrate that borrowers’ gender 
and race significantly affect investors’ funding decisions, thereby, it is believed that borrowers’ status may be a causal 
mechanism driving lending discrimination. 
 
Regional discrimination is a meaningful and interesting research topic, whether in sociology or in economics. With the 
research of Li et al. as reference, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the micro data of individual level from Peer to Peer 
lending, to further explore the regional discrimination in China's P2P lending. 
 
Li et al. explore regional discrimination from a province standpoint [14], they mainly analysis whether the success rates of P2P 
orders for all the provinces are significantly different, as well as the differences of the default rates between the discriminated 
provinces and others. The research angle of this thesis is different. This paper has not divide the regions in accordance with the 
existing geographical regions, such as central China, southern China and other administrative divisions or provinces. 
Considering the research content belongs to economics, areas in the same province are usually of uneven development, and 
different provinces also have areas with similar development, so we will grade all the cities in accordance with their 
comprehensive development level combined with existing "Chinese city grading standards". In a word, this paper primarily 
discusses regional discrimination in China's P2P lending market from the perspective of city. The key research problems are: 
whether investors have discrimination against cities with different development; if it does, what is the difference between the 
default rates of discriminated cities and other cities? Is this a tasted-based discrimination or statistical discrimination? 
 
DATA ACQUISITION AND MODEL DESIGN 
Data Acquisition and Website Description 
At present, the cities of mainland China are normally divided into four levels: "all-around developed cities", "mid-developed 
cities", "less-developed cities", and "least-developed cities". In 338 cities at prefectural level and above, all-around cities refer 
to the four old first-tier cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; mid-developed cities include Tianjin and 23 
second-tier developed and mid-developed cities such as Hangzhou; less-developed cities consist of second-tier less-developed 
cities and third-tier cities such as Hefei and Nanchang; the rest are classified as the least-developed cities. 
 
Data for this study is obtained from one of China's P2P lending platforms – Peer to Peer lending, which was established in May 
2010. Currently, the loan amount borrowers may apply for is 3000-500000 yuan, with the annual interest rate of 7%-24%, and 
the loan period that borrowers can choose is 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 24 months. The repayment mode is repaying principal and 
interest of the same per month. Figure 1 is about the loan process for this platform. On top of this, borrowers cannot apply for 
overdue repayment; otherwise they will have to bear default interest and certain management fees, and will be deducted 
corresponding credit score. The annual report of Peer to Peer shows the rate of bad debt in 2015 is 0.37%, where bad debt is 
overdue repayment of more than 30 days. 
 
 
Figure 1: The loan process of Peer to Peer Lending platform 
 
This paper gets 500981 scattered transaction data through crawler, from January 2015 to March 2016. Removing the data 
whose regional item is missing or meaningless, finally there is 364523 valid data as the study sample. Many existing studies 
show that gender has little effect on the success of loan [1] [3] [15]. On the other hand, this platform does not require 
borrowers to fill in their gender. So this article does not take gender into account. As mentioned above, this study aims to 
explore whether investors have an investment discrimination against different cities, so city attribute is an indispensable and 
important variable. In data preprocessing stage, we process borrowers’ regional information to obtain city name, and then 
match the level of cities for more than 360 thousand data through database. 
 
Variable Setting 
As needed in research, the main variables are set as follows, which can be obtained from the original data directly or indirectly: 
 
Table 1: Variable Description 
Variables Description 
success A virtual variable, its value is 1 when loan is successful, or 0. 
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overdue The value of overdue loan is 1, otherwise 0. The repayment of loan late more than 30 
days will be marked as bad debt; both refund late 1-30 days and bad debt orders are 
regarded as overdue. 
ln(money) The log value of loan amount. Before the release of fund-raising, the platform will 
communicate loan amount and interest rate with borrowers in accordance with their 
credit rating and line.  
rate The annual interest rate, range is 7%-24%. 
period The term that borrowers can use the loan as promised. 
city_degree The 338 cities are divided into four levels: "all-around developed cities", 
"mid-developed cities", "less-developed cities", and "least-developed cities", they are 
marked with 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively. 
num_success The number of times that borrower has succeeded in raising money. 
credit The credit score of borrowers, given by the platform after a comprehensive 
assessment of various aspects of borrowers. 
num_overdue The number of times that borrower defaults. 
age The age of borrowers. 
education High school and below, junior college, undergraduate, graduate and above 
qualifications are respectively marked as 1, 2, 3, 4. 
marriage The unmarried, married, divorced or widowed are assigned value of 1, 2 and 3. 
income Monthly income of borrowers. 
houseloan The value is 1 when borrower has a mortgage, otherwise 0. 
carloan The value is 1 when borrower has an automobile loan, otherwise 0. 
 
The independent variables except city grade are divided into three categories, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Classification of variables 
Order   
information（D） 
Credit   
information（X） 
Population 
characteristics（T） 
Financial 
information（C） 
ln(money) credit age income 
rate num_success education houseloan 
period num_overdue marriage carloan 
 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
success 364523 0.33 0.471 0 1 
overdue 21078 0.10 0.304 0 1 
ln(money) 364523 10.4238 1.15997 7.60 13.12 
rate 364523 12.382 1.8862 3.0 24.4 
period 364523 20.12 10.480 3 36 
city_degree 364523 2.32 1. 030 1 4 
num_success 364523 0.52 2.754 0 144 
credit 364523 69.53 75.045 0 3220 
num_overdue 364523 0.20 1.400 0 54 
age 364523 32.62 7.590 16 71 
education 364195 1.90 0.771 1 4 
marriage 364484 1.69 0.583 1 3 
income 363492 4.05 1.164 1 7 
houseloan 364523 0.23 0.420 0 1 
carloan 364523 0.07 0.455 0 1 
 
Modeling 
To explore people’s discrimination against different grades of cities, we first examine if there is a significant difference among 
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their success rates. However, descriptive statistics and variance analysis in the following cannot prove the difference is 
"robust", for various factors do affect the outcome. Other factors should be controlled so as to test the effect of city grade on 
loan success. To this end, we take "success" as the dependent variable, to build logistic regression model (1): 
 
logit（P | success=1）=α +β1×city_degree +β2×D+β3×X +β4×T +β5×C+ε                                           (1) 
 
In this model, P represents the frequency of loan success, logit P = ln 。 
 
Denote D、X、T、C, respectively, as the variables of loan order information, borrower's credit, characteristics and financial 
information, and denote β1、β2、β3、β4、β5 as the corresponding coefficient matrix. In addition, α is the constant and ε represents 
random error. In model (1), when controlling the variables of loan order, borrower's credit and other information, if β1 is 
significant, then it can be inferred that city grade has a significant impact on borrower’s loan success rate, namely investors 
indeed have discrimination against different cities. 
 
After that we will further investigate the difference of loan default rates among each grade cities, analyze how the default rates 
of being discriminated cities differ from others, so as to infer if the discrimination is non-rational tasted-based. In the same way, 
we construct the logistic regression model (2) with “overdue” as the dependent variable: 
 
logit（P | overdue=1）=α +β1×city_degree +β2×D+β3×X +β4×T +β5×C+ε                                          (2) 
 
In model (2), P represents the frequency of loan overdue.  
 
And logit P = ln , the meaning of other variables are the same as in model (1). 
 
For model (2), only the orders whose status is displayed as "overdue" or "bad debt" are included. When controlling for other 
factors, if β1 is significantly negative, indicating the lower of the city grade, the higher the default rate; Conversely, if β1 is 
significantly positive, indicating that the default rate of higher grade city is higher; while a non-significant β1 means city grade 
has no significant influence on default rate. By further studying the relationship between default rates and success rates of 
different cities, we can infer whether there is statistical or tasted-based regional discrimination in investors' behavior. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics and Difference Test 
Descriptive statistics of order status for each grade cities are shown in Table IV. Among them, "closed", "repaying", "overdue" 
and "bad debt" mean having completed borrowing money, which belong to success category. And "overdue" and "bad debt" 
orders pertain to overdue category, not overdue orders refer to "closed" orders, the repayment of which have been 
accomplished. So we will exclude the "failed" and "repaying" orders when study overdue ones. From Table IV we can see that 
the total loan orders in the least-developed cities reach 102397, and its failure, overdue and bad debt orders are significantly 
more than the other three grades of cities.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of order status of different cities 
City grade Failed 
Success 
Total 
Closed Repaying Overdue Bad debt 
least-developed 84798 3554 13191 111 743 102397 
less-developed 62090 4819 27189 87 494 94679 
mid-developed 59474 7658 48470 57 363 116022 
all-around 
developed 
37280 2870 10953 63 259 51425 
 
To intuitively compare the success rate and default rate of different cities, we give the statistical results in Table 4. As can be 
seen from Table V, the success rate of least-developed cities is the lowest, only 17.2%, significantly lower than others; and that 
of mid-developed cities is as high as 48.7%. On the other hand, mid-developed cities have the lowest default rate of 5.2%, 
while that of least-developed cities reaches 19.4%. Overall, for different cities, there is apparently great difference of success 
rate as well as default rate. 
 
Table 5: Statistics of success rate and default rate of each great city 
City grade Success rate Default rate 
least-developed 17.2% 19.4% 
less-developed 34.4% 10.8% 
mid-developed 48.7% 5.2% 
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all-around 
developed 
27.5% 10.1% 
 
Furthermore, variance analysis is used to compare the success rate of four-grade cities, and the results are shown in Table 5, 
including mean difference and standard error, and P value is marked out by “*”. The average success rate of each grade city is 
compared with the other three grades. It can be seen that the mean difference of each grade city with others is significant at the 
5% level. So we can believe that discrimination may exist for there is a significant difference among the success rates of 
different cities. 
 
Table 6: Pairwise comparison test of the success rate of each level city 
City（I）      City（J） Mean difference（I-J） SE 
least-developed 
less-developed -.1722* .00199 
mid-developed -.3154* .00189 
all-around 
developed 
-.1031* .00239 
less-developed 
least-developed .1722* .00199 
mid-developed -.1432* .00193 
all-around 
developed 
.0691* .00242 
mid-developed 
least-developed .3154* .00189 
less-developed .1432* .00193 
all-around 
developed 
.2123* .00234 
all-around 
developed 
least-developed .1031* .00239 
less-developed -.0691* .00242 
mid-developed -.2123* .00234 
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
Whether Investors Have Regional Discrimination 
Preliminary judgment for the results described above is not enough to prove that investors have discrimination against different 
cities. The reason is that except city grade, there are many other factors including order itself, borrower's credit and financial 
information will affect investor's decision. Therefore, we use model (1) to control other factors to accurately analyze the effect 
of city grade. 
 
In Table 7, we give the regression results of model (1), where model 1 contains only one independent variable, and model 2, 3, 
4 are gradually added to order variables, borrower's credit variables and finally all other variables. The chi square tests of the 
four models are all significant. With the addition of more variables, R2 gradually increased to 0.935, indicating that the selected 
variables have strong explanatory power to the dependent variable. 
 
In model 1, the coefficient of city grade is 0.338 and is significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting that city grade has significant 
influence on dependent variable when other factors are not considered. At this time R2 is only 0.036, so the explanatory power 
is low. With the addition of more variables, the coefficient of city grade in model 2, 3 and 4 is on the decrease, and is always 
significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting that when controlling order information, borrowers' credit information and 
other characteristics, city grade still plays an important part. Specifically, borrowers in the higher grade cities are more likely to 
get the favor of investors, while borrowers of the less developed cities will probably fail to borrow money. This result is 
consistent with the results of previous descriptive statistics and analysis of variance. Thus it can be seen that investors indeed 
have discrimination against cities of different grades in P2P lending. 
 
Table 7: Test of whether investors have discrimination against different cities 
 
Dependent variable: success 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Constant -1.505*** 10.758*** 2.129*** 1.878*** 
 （0.009） （0.082） （0.136） （0.143） 
city_degree 0.338*** 0.285*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 
 （0.003） （0.005） （0.011） （0.011） 
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ln(money)  0.113*** -0.706*** -0.925*** 
  （0.005） （0.013） （0.015） 
rate  -1.451*** -0.181*** -0.180*** 
  （0.006） （0.006） （0.006） 
period  0.195*** 0.033*** 0.045*** 
  （0.001） （0.001） （0.001） 
num_success   -0.060*** -0.061*** 
   （0.004） （0.004） 
credit   0.062*** 0.060*** 
   （0.000） （0.000） 
num_overdue   0.518*** 0.508*** 
   （0.005） （0.005） 
income    0.279*** 
    （0.011） 
houseloan    0.238*** 
    （0.029） 
carloan    0.169*** 
    （0.044） 
age    0.027*** 
    （0.002） 
education    0.030** 
    （0.015） 
marriage    0.141*** 
    （0.024） 
R2 0.036 0.515 0.933 0.935 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
From the comprehensive analysis of model 1-4 we can see that, both loan amount and rate have significant negative effect on 
loan. This means that the success rate will decline with the increase of loan mount, which is consistent with the results of Puro 
et al. [17], the possible reason is that the default risk may increase. And when setting higher interest rates, borrowers are not so 
easy to succeed in financing, because high interest rate is more likely to pose a high risk. Obviously most investors are quite 
rational in investment and not simply in the pursuit of high returns without considering the potential risk [7]. Besides, both 
credit score and borrower's monthly income have significant positive impact. It shows that the higher the credit score is, the 
easier it is to borrow money, which is consistent with the empirical research of Klafft for Prosper, an American P2P lending 
platform. He finds borrower's credit score has the most significant impact on the success of loan; and the risk level of more 
than half of the orders on Prosper is HR, while the success ratio is only 5.5% [12]. Monthly income to a certain extent 
represents borrower's ability to repay. One can easily envisage people with high income may have better repayment ability and 
lower default risk, so it may be easier for them to obtain financing. 
 
Surprisingly, we find out historical success times has a significant negative effect on loan, while overdue times has a 
significant positive effect. This is totally opposed to our intuitive conjecture. A possible explanation is that both the two 
variables can only reflect the conditions of all borrowers from one side, and are far from sufficient to detect the circumstances 
of every single borrower. For example, borrowers with more success times may have more overdue records, and those with 
less are likely to have few record of success. 
 
The Examination of the Rationality of Regional Discrimination 
Taking "overdue" as dependent variable, we show the regression results of model (2) in Table 8. Model 1 tells us without 
considering other factors, the coefficient of city grade is significantly negative. In model 2, with order variables being added, 
city grade still negatively impact dependent variable, while the overall fit of model 1 and 2 is relatively low. With the addition 
of more variables, the explanatory power of selected variables on overdue increased gradually. Nevertheless, we find the 
coefficient of city grade is remained negative but no longer significant in model 3 and 4. Altogether, the higher the city grade, 
the lower the default rate. This is basically consistent with the results shown in Table V. Combined with the results of model (1), 
we can make a preliminary inference, that is, investors do have discrimination against different regions, and it is a rational 
statistical discrimination. 
 
When the selected variables are all added (model 4), it can be seen that both loan period and overdue times positive affect 
overdue significantly. It follows that the longer duration of the loan, the greater the uncertainty that borrowers repay on time. 
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Also, the credit of borrowers with more historical overdue times is usually low, who are more likely to make overdue 
repayment again. On the other hand, the coefficients of credit and historical success times are significantly negative, indicating 
that making overdue repayment seldom happens to borrowers with higher credit score and more success times. It is often a 
virtuous cycle, making repayment on time is conducive to the accumulation of credit, as well as the next success of the loan. 
 
Table 8: Test of the rationality of regional discrimination 
 
Dependent variable: overdue 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 
Variables  
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Constant -1.140*** 1.739 -0.329 0.622 
 （0.056） （0.345） （0.714） （0.711） 
city_degree -0.442*** -0.382*** -0.039 -0.060 
 （0.024） （0.024） （0.043） （0.044） 
ln(money)  -0.413*** 0.098 0.007 
  （0.032） （0.063） （0.076） 
rate  0.068*** 0.034 0.022 
  （0.010） （0.023） （0.023） 
period  0.016*** 0.098*** 0.107*** 
  （0.001） （0.006） （0.007） 
num_success   -0.378*** -0.382*** 
   （0.030） （0.031） 
credit   -0.051*** -0.050*** 
   （0.001） （0.001） 
num_overdue   0.087*** 0.086*** 
   （0.011） （0.011） 
income    0.124*** 
    （0.043） 
houseloan    -0.507*** 
    （0.119） 
carloan    0.117 
    （0.166） 
age    -0.001 
    （0.008） 
education    -0.247*** 
    （0.059） 
marriage    0.027 
    （0.093） 
R2 0.035 0.068 0.791 0.794 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In Figure 2, we describe the relationship between default rates and success rates by a scatter diagram. From the graph we can 
see that there is a negative correlation between them. Specifically, as default rates rise, success rates will decline accordingly. 
So it can be inferred that default rate bears a huge responsibility for the difference among success rates of different cities. 
Combined with the results of model (1) and (2), we have reason to believe that investors’ discrimination against different cities 
is a rational statistical discrimination. 
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Figure 2: Scatter plots of default rate and success rate of each level city 
 
Robust Test 
1. In order to verify the relationship between default rates and success rates of different cities, we build a linear regression 
model with "rate_success" as the dependent variable and "rate_overdue" as the independent variable. The results are shown in 
Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Test of the relationship between default rate and success rate 
 
Dependent variable: rate_success 
Coefficients SE  
Constant 0.556* 0.073 
rate_overdue -2.082** 0.058 
R2 0.797 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We can see from Table 9, the model's explanatory power is 79.7%, and the coefficient of default rate is -2.082 and significant 
at the 5% level, suggesting that success rates will decline as default rates rise. Namely, the success rate of cities with higher 
default rate is lower, once again proving that investors’ regional discrimination is a rational statistical discrimination. 
 
2. We divide all the cities into four grades according to the existing standards and the general division. But in fact, with the 
development of various regions, the classification criterion of cities is constantly changing. According to "China's new urban 
grading standards", all cities are divided into first tier to sixth tier, where second-tier cities are divided into "second-tier 
developed cities", "second-tier mid-developed cities" and "second-tier less-developed cities". Based on this classification, we 
will test the robustness of previous analysis. This time, third to sixth tier cities are respectively assigned value of 4、3、2、1; the 
value of second-tier developed、mid-developed and less-developed cities are 4.5, 5, 5.5; and first-tier cities take the value of 6. 
 
Table 10 shows the results of robustness test--the regression results of model (1) and (2) after changing the value of city grade 
(city_degree). We can see that, after fixing other variables, city grade still has a significant positive effect on the success of 
loan. Once again it is verified that investors do have discrimination against different cities. On the other hand, the regression 
results for overdue show that the coefficient of city grade is negative but not significant, consistent with the previous analysis. 
It indicates that the difference in default rate may be the result of a combined effect of various factors. In order to further 
clarify the regional discrimination is rational or irrational, we examine the correlation between success rate and default rate 
through a scatter plot and a fitting trend line in Figure 3. 
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Table 10: Robustness test 
 Dependent variable: success Dependent variable: overdue 
Variables Coefficients SE  Coefficients SE  
Constant 1.826*** 0.145 -0.623 0.772 
city_degree 0.056*** 0.008 -0.037 0.032 
ln(money) -0.925*** 0.015 0.009 0.077 
rate -0.180*** 0.006 0.022 0.023 
period 0.044*** 0.001 0.107*** 0.007 
num_success -0.061*** 0.004 -0.383*** 0.031 
credit 0.060*** 0.000 -0.050*** 0.001 
num_overdue 0.508*** 0.005 0.086*** 0.011 
income 0.279*** 0.011 0.123*** 0.043 
houseloan 0.236*** 0.029 -0.504*** 0.119 
carloan 0.163*** 0.044 0.124 0.166 
age 0.027*** 0.002 0.000 0.008 
education 0.033** 0.015 -0.248*** 0.059 
marriage 0.138*** 0.024 0.030 0.093 
R2 0.935 0.794 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We can easily see from Figure 3 that there is a significant negative correlation between success rate and default rate, and the R2 
of linear correlation is 0.834. From the overall trend of view, the higher the default rate of the region, the lower its success rate. 
Also it shows that investors may not simply discriminate against less-developed regions (e.g., fourth to sixth tier cities), but 
make more rational investment decisions in the face of higher default rates, then involved more in investment activities of 
cities with lower default rates. By this taken, the discrimination of investors against different regions is a kind of rational 
statistical discrimination. It means that our results are robust. 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plots of default rate and success rate of different cities 
 
CONCLUSION AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
In sociology, there has been considerable progress in regional discrimination research, while in economics, especially in credit 
market there is not much study. The extant research examining lending discrimination generally has focused on demographic 
characteristics including race and gender, while few researchers study the influence of regional factors on investors' decision 
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making. For the first time, this paper discusses that in the emerging P2P lending market, which is friendlier to both lenders and 
borrowers, whether the funding behavior of investors is still regional discriminatory, and thus fill up the gap. 
 
It is intended to shed light on regional discrimination in China's P2P lending market from the perspective of city. Through 
empirical analysis on the micro loan data of individual level from Peer to Peer lending, we find that city grade has a significant 
positive effect on loan under the control of other factors. This suggests that there is a significant difference among success rates 
of cities with different development, reflecting the regional discrimination of investors. In other words, the allocation of 
funding in these cities is brimming with bias, whereas we do not yet know definitely what the causal mechanisms that account 
for discriminatory behavior are. Further research finds that city grade has a negative but not significant effect on default rate. 
Combined with the fitting trend of scatter plot, it is clear that there is a significantly negative correlation between success rate 
and default rate. As default rates rise, success rates will decline accordingly. Thereby, we can finally conclude that, it is default 
rate rather than regional preference that should account for discrimination, indicating it is a rational statistical discrimination. 
This conclusion is different from previous research [14]. 
 
Investors’ discriminating between loan applicants may be part attributable to their stereotypes and prejudices, but we have not 
yet probed into the causal mechanisms. Future research can further explore discrimination and its causes in credit market from 
other aspects such as the identity of borrowers, cultural differences and so on. Anyway, this paper enriches the study on P2P 
lending behavior in finance, especially on regional discrimination, which has certain significance for scholars to know China's 
P2P lending market and its discrimination.  
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APPENDIX 
In 2016, “The New First Tier Cities Institute”, a data news project of First Financial, regrades 338 cities at prefectural level and 
above of China by means of weighted average calculation of 5 dimensions: the concentration of business resources, the hub of 
city, people's activeness, life diversity and future plasticity, after investigating the distribution of 160 brands and the user data 
of 14 Internet companies. In the list, the four old first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen still maintain 
their front-line positions, followed by 15 new first-tier cities:  Chengdu, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Tianjin, Nanjing, Chongqing, 
Xi'an, Changsha, Qingdao, Shenyang, Dalian, Xiamen, Suzhou, Ningbo and Wuxi; the second-tier cities include 30 cities such 
as Hefei and Zhengzhou; besides, there are 70 third-tier cities, 90 fourth-tier cities and 129 fifth-tier cities. However, in the list 
of city classification of 2014, first-tier cities also include Tianjin except four old first-tier cities; Hangzhou, Nanjing, Jinan, 
Chongqing, Qingdao, Dalian, Ningbo and Xiamen are classified as second-tier developed cities; second-tier mid-developed 
cities include 15 cities, such as Chengdu and Wuhan; Hefei and other six cities are categorized as second-tier less developed 
cities. We divide all the 338 cities into four grades according to the existing standards and the division of the public generally 
recognized: "all-around developed cities", "mid-developed cities", "less-developed cities", and "least-developed cities". Here, 
all-around cities refer to the four old first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; mid-developed cities 
include Tianjin and the second-tier developed and mid-developed cities in list of 2014; less-developed cities consist of 
second-tier less-developed cities and third-tier cities such as Hefei and Nanchang according to the classification of 2014; the 
rest are classed as least-developed cities. 
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